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The Atomic Bomb at 70 Years -Nuclear disaster and health- 2: Impact of nuclear 1 
accidents on health and society – a review of health effects of radiation and other 2 
problems arising in the aftermath of nuclear accidents with special emphasis on the 3 







Currently, 437 nuclear power plants are in operation around the world to meet 8 
increasing energy demands. Unfortunately, major nuclear accidents have occurred over 9 
the last 6 decades, i.e. the Kyshtym (1957, Russia), Windscale Piles (1957, England), 10 
Three Mile Island (1979, USA), Chernobyl (1986, Russia) and Fukushima accidents in 11 
2011. The impacts of nuclear disasters on individuals and societies are diverse and 12 
enduring. The accumulated evidence about the radiation health effects on atomic bomb 13 
survivors and other radiation-exposed victims has formed the basis for national 14 
regulations concerning radiation protection. Past experiences has indicated, however, 15 
that common issues were not necessarily physical health problems directly attributable 16 
to radiation exposure; they were associated with psychological and social aspects in the 17 
affected populations. Evacuation and long-term displacement also created severe 18 
health-care problems in those who are most vulnerable, such as hospitalized patients 19 
and elderly people. An open and joint learning process is essential to prepare and 20 
minimize the impact of future nuclear accidents. 21 
(159 words) 22 
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Key messages 27 
 28 
 Currently, 437 nuclear power plants (NPPs) are in operation around the world; half 29 
are located in areas more densely populated than the area of the Fukushima 30 
Daiichi NPP, suggesting a severe nuclear accident would affect a large number of 31 
people. 32 
 Although major nuclear accidents are uncommon, there have been five in the past 33 
six decades, resulting in not only severe health effects attributable to radiation 34 
exposure but also other serious health issues.  35 
 In addition to the severe health effects of radiation exposure (i.e., acute radiation 36 
syndrome and an increased incidence of cancer), a critical issue following the 37 
Chernobyl accident was adverse effects on mental health, which has also been 38 
observed following the Fukushima accident. 39 
 The Fukushima accident revealed severe health risks of unplanned evacuation and 40 
relocation for vulnerable population such as hospitalised patients and elderly 41 
people requiring nursing care, as well as a failure to respond to emergency medical 42 
needs at the NPP. Furthermore, displacement of a large number of people has 43 
created a wide range of public health care and social issues. 44 
 Health care professionals should balance the protection from radiation with other 45 
health risks when addressing problems arising in a nuclear disaster. 46 
 47 
  48 
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Search strategy and selection criteria section 49 
 50 
We conducted a systematic review of the published literature and documents in PubMed, 51 
Medline, CiNii, and Google Scholar with search terms ―Kyshtym accident‖, ―Windscale 52 
Piles accident‖, ―Chernobyl accident‖, ―Three Mile Island accident‖ or ―Fukushima 53 
accident‖, and ―radiation disaster‖, ―nuclear accident, evacuation‖ or ―evacuation of 54 
hospital, disaster‖ together with ―Fukushima‖. We also examined the reports of the 55 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for the 56 
Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents and those published by the United States and 57 
Japanese government on the Three Mile Island and Fukushima accidents, including 58 
references cited in these reports. For the empirical data, we could not identify 59 
peer-reviewed articles or reports on the latest results from the Fukushima Health 60 
Management survey and thus decided to review those on its official web site. With 61 
regard to the impact on mental health, we searched PubMed, Medline, CiNii, Google 62 
Scholar and reviewed published studies in addition to employing the above-mentioned 63 
methods, with search terms ―mental health‖ and ―nuclear disaster‖, and ―stigma‖, 64 
―PTSD‖ or ―psychiatric disorder‖ together with ―nuclear disaster‖ or ―atomic bombing‖. 65 
We also reviewed non-peer reviewed literature including the media using the terms 66 
such as ―radiation stigma‖ and ―Fukushima‖ for other socio-behavioural issues. We also 67 
assessed the regulations and legislations on radiological protection using the 68 
International Commission on Radiological Protection and official documents published 69 
by the United State and Japanese governments. 70 





Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—one of the most tragic events in 74 
the human history, accumulated evidence on the radiation effects on atomic-bomb 75 
survivors and other radiation-exposed victims has formed the basis for national and 76 
international regulations on radiation protection.1 The peaceful use of nuclear energy 77 
has been pursued since December 1953 when US President Eisenhower delivered 78 
―Atoms for Peace‖ speech,2 and many nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been built 79 
around the world to meet increasing energy demands. Unfortunately, though, severe 80 
nuclear accidents occurred,3 resulting in negative health effects directly attributable to 81 
radiation as well as various indirect health and social impacts.4-6 Currently, 437 NPPs 82 
are in operation around the world, and more will be constructed as developing countries 83 
are seeking for efficient and stable energy sources.7 A severe accident at one of these 84 
plants would affect a large number of people.8  85 
 86 
This paper describes previous major nuclear accidents, with a special emphasis on the 87 
Fukushima accident in 2011. We assess not only medical but also psychological and 88 
societal issues related to major nuclear accidents. We then summarise the lessons 89 
learned and major policy implications. We conclude the paper by discussing better 90 
preparedness with the aim to minimise the health effects of radiation and to cope with 91 
other critical health-care and social needs after such accidents. 92 
 93 
Past major nuclear accidents 94 
Over the last 7 decades, more than 440 major radiation accidents occurred worldwide. 95 
Majority of them were related to radiation devices and radioisotopes with limited 96 
consequences.9 Although uncommon, 20 criticalities including the Fukushima accident 97 
occurred, resulting in significant influences on people and environment. In the 98 
meantime, the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was 99 
developed as a worldwide tool to understand the significance of nuclear and radiological 100 
events.3 Until the Fukushima accident, four major nuclear accidents had been rated as 101 
INES level 5 or greater. They include; Kyshtym (1957, Russia), Windscale Piles (1957, 102 
England), Three Mile Island (1979, USA), and Chernobyl (1986, Russia) as described 103 
below (Table). 104 
 105 
The Kyshtym accident 106 
Soon after the Second World War, liquid radioactive wastes dumped from the nuclear 107 
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facilities, the Mayak Nuclear Materials Production Complex (PA ―Mayak‖) in the 108 
southern Urals, Russia and, caused serious contamination of the Techa River and the 109 
vicinity of the nuclear compound.10 On September 29, 1957, a serious accident occurred 110 
at the PA ―Mayak‖ called Kyshtym accident. Failure in the cooling system used for the 111 
concrete tanks containing highly active nitrate-acetate wastes caused a chemical 112 
explosion, resulting in a huge release of chemicals and radioactive fission products into 113 
the atmosphere and disposition of these materials onto the surrounding area. An area of 114 
105km length and 8-9km width was contaminated with Sr-90. More than 10,000 people 115 
were eventually evacuated.11 This accident was rated as level 6 on the INES scale 116 
(Significant release of radioactive material).3 117 
 118 
Windscale Piles accident 119 
On October 10, 1957, a fire broke out in the Windscale Piles, a nuclear reactor designed 120 
to produce plutonium at Windscale Works, Sellafield, in the UK, and irradiated 121 
uranium oxide particles were released.11,12 Although no citizens were evacuated, a milk 122 
distribution was banned in an area stretching from 10 km north of Windscale Works to 123 
20 km to the south. This was the first severe accident of a nuclear facility which led to a 124 
large discharge of radionuclides including I-131 and was rated as INES level 5 (limited 125 
release of radioactive material).12 126 
 127 
Three Mile Island accident 128 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident was the first major NPP accident to advise the 129 
evacuation of residents. On March 28, 1979, troubles in the cooling systems of the 130 
TMI-2 reactor resulted in the release of large amounts of vaporized coolant into the 131 
atmosphere.13 Pregnant women and preschool children living within a 5-mile (8-km) 132 
radius of the plant were advised to evacuate. Two days later, a plan was made to expand 133 
the evacuation zone to a 10-mile and then a 20-mile (32-km) radius; the population 134 
subject to evacuation increased from 27,000 within a 5-mile radius to 700,000 within a 135 
20-mile radius.14 In the preliminary evacuation plan, evacuation was believed necessary 136 
only for a 5-mile radius of the TMI,14 where there were just three nursing facilities and 137 
no hospitals. Within the 20-mile radius of the TMI, there were 14 hospitals and 62 138 
nursing facilities.14 Fortunately, the reactor was brought under control, and hospital 139 
evacuation was avoided. Although the health effects of radiation exposure to residents 140 
were negligible, the TMI accident, which was also rated INES level 5 (Severe damage to 141 
reactor core), highlighted such challenges as evacuating hospitals and nursing homes in 142 




Chernobyl accident 145 
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the worst nuclear accident in history and was the 146 
first accident to be rated INES Level 7 (Major release of radioactive material). Among 147 
600 workers involved with the emergency response, 134 workers developed acute 148 
radiation syndrome (ARS), resulting in 28 deaths.4 In all, 220,000 residents were 149 
evacuated. One of the most significant public health effects of radiation was an 150 
increased incidence of thyroid cancer in pediatric residents. Ingestion of contaminated 151 
dairy products was the main route for absorbing radioactive iodine.4 Increased cancer 152 
incidence due to low-dose exposure has not been established.4 The Chernobyl accident, 153 
however, revealed other serious issues not directly attributable to radiation health 154 
effects: i.e. long-term psychosocial effects.5  155 
 156 
The Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident  157 
Japan previously operated 54 NPPs along its coasts.16 The occurrence of a compound 158 
disaster, in which an earthquake, tsunami, or other natural phenomenon would cause 159 
such a critical event as an NPP accident, was perhaps inevitable in such a seismically 160 
active country. The 6.8-magnitude Chuetsu offshore earthquake in 2007 caused a 161 
leakage of contaminated water from the spent-fuel pool of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. 162 
The event did not develop into a critical accident, but it was a precursor to the disaster 163 
at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP.17 164 
On March 11, 2011, a 9-magnitude earthquake occurred off the east coast of Japan, 165 
generating massive tsunamis, which severely damaged coastal areas and claimed 166 
18,470 lives (15891 deaths, 2579 missing as of May 8, 2015).18 The Fukushima Daiichi 167 
NPP was the only NPP to lose its core cooling capacity entirely after the disaster, which 168 
caused severe damage to the nuclear cores and led to an INES Level 7-rated accident. 169 
Consequently, substantial amounts of radioactive material escaped into the 170 
environment.19,20 171 
 172 
Japan’s response to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident 173 
While all-out efforts were being made to cool the nuclear fuels, the government 174 
progressively issued emergency evacuation orders between March 11 and 13 to 175 
residents living within a radius of 3, 10, and 20 km of the NPP (Figure 1). Most of 176 
residents living within the 20-km radius had been evacuated by March 15, when the 177 
strongest radioactive plume was released.21   178 
Hydrogen explosions occurred at Reactor No. 1 on March 12 and Reactor No. 3 on March 179 
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14 injuring 16 emergency workers. It was difficult for the injured to access medical 180 
services since local emergency medical institutions had either closed or were barely 181 
operating.22 (Panel 1) 182 
 183 
Radiation exposure to emergency and recovery workers 184 
In response to the accident, several thousand workers—mostly contractors—performed 185 
on-site emergency operations.19 According to a 2013 TEPCO report, under 1% of all such 186 
workers were found to have been exposed to a radiation dose (effective dose, combined 187 
external and internal sources) of 100 mSv or higher; the average dose was 11.9 mSv 188 
(Figure 2)(Panel 2). Among 173 workers whose exposure dose exceeded 100 mSv, 86% 189 
were skilled TEPCO workers. The dose rates of six emergency workers exceeded 250 190 
mSv; however no worker received a radiation exposure dose beyond 1000 mSv.26 Notably, 191 
most of the injuries or illnesses were not related to radiation exposure (Panel 3). The 192 
maximum exposure dose among JSDF personnel and firefighters involved in the 193 
emergency operation was 81.2 mSv.28  194 
 195 
Thus, no acute effects of radiation exposure such as ARS have been observed following 196 
the Fukushima accident. In this sense, protection of emergency workers from radiation 197 
may have been achieved. However, for those with radiation exposure greater than 100 198 
mSv, a small increase incidence of cancer attributable to radiation exposure may be 199 
expected.6,29,30 200 
 201 
Radiation exposure to Fukushima Prefecture residents  202 
In a nuclear accident, exposure to radioactive materials takes several pathways: 203 
external exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground (groundshine) or in the 204 
radioactive cloud (cloudshine), and internal exposure from inhalation of radionuclides 205 
or by ingesting food or water.30  206 
 207 
Early radiation exposure 208 
According to reports released in August 2014, estimated external effective doses for 209 
between March 11 and July 11, 2011 were no more than 2 mSv in 94% of the 210 
respondents (mean dose, 0.8 mSv).31,32 The maximum external exposure was 25 mSv, 211 
and most doses occurred soon after the accident.33 However, exposure to radioactive 212 
iodine is a major concern, particularly among paediatric residents.4 In Fukushima, tap 213 
water, food, and raw milk were tested soon after the accident, and distribution 214 
restrictions were implemented for food, including dairy products.19,34 Unlike with the 215 
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Chernobyl accident, incorporation of radioactive iodine in Fukushima is believed to 216 
have been mainly via inhalation.6,35 The maximum dose rate of exposure occurred after 217 
the massive radioactive plume was released on March 15.20 Based on System for 218 
Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) data, the 219 
maximum average thyroid dose in the most affected district was estimated to be 220 
approximately 80 mGy for 1-year-old infants—the age-group most vulnerable to 221 
radioactive iodine.6  222 
 223 
Direct measurement of internal radiation doses was, however, possible only for a limited 224 
number of evacuees owing to the difficult circumstances after the accident. According to 225 
a report using thyroid monitors for 62 evacuees from the 30-km zone, maximum and 226 
median thyroid equivalent doses in adults of 33 and 3.6 mSv, respectively, and 23 and 227 
4.2mSv in children.36 Another study employing a whole-body counter determined that 228 
detectable iodine activity was found in 25% of 196 evacuees and medical support 229 
members who remained in the 20- to 30-km indoor-sheltering zone. Their maximum 230 
thyroid equivalent dose and median dose were 18.5 and 0.67 mSv, respectively.35,37 In 231 
the World Health Organization (WHO) preliminary estimation, exposure dose in the 232 
first year was extrapolated from measurements as of mid-September 2011.30 Due to the 233 
Dose Expert Panel’s timeframe, updated data of dose estimation were not incorporated. 234 
Therefore in the WHO’s assessment, the dose estimates and assumptions were 235 
deliberately made so as to minimize underestimation of potential health risks, i.e., err 236 
on the side of caution. The report showed that the greatest risk was found among 237 
paediatric females exposed in the most heavily exposed areas in Fukushima Prefecture. 238 
The excess absolute risk for these people was estimated to be small, but, they had a 239 
comparatively high relative increase in lifetime risk due to the low baseline risk 240 
estimated for this area.38 The WHO’s Health Risk Assessment (HRA) report 241 
recommended continuing monitoring children’s health due to these risks. 242 
 243 
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 244 
(UNSCEAR) 2013 report relied principally on data and literatures available before the 245 
end of September 2012.6 This report, may have overestimated actual exposures due to 246 
the limited available information at this time. The assessment of radio contamination of 247 
the thyroid through direct methods found doses 3-5 times lower than those estimated by 248 
the Committee.6 Based on these potential over-estimates, the UNSCEAR report 249 
identified the potential increased risk of thyroid cancer among pediatric residents of the 250 
districts with the highest estimated average radiation exposure and recommended close 251 
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monitoring and follow-up of affected children. 252 
 253 
Stable iodine tablets are one recommended radiation protection measures.39 In the early 254 
stages following the accident, there was confusion as to whether residents needed the 255 
tablets.19 However, estimations of thyroid tissue equivalent doses suggest no need for 256 
the stable iodine tablets.19 High iodine intake through daily seaweed ingestion in the 257 
Japanese diet may suppress the incorporation of radioactive iodine by the thyroid 258 
gland.40 Nonetheless, public concern over the initial thyroid exposures has led to the 259 
implementation of a screening program for all children in Fukushima, while there is 260 
ongoing debate in the Japanese medical community about the ethical aspects of this 261 
program, as well as its implications for overdetection and overtreatment of thyroid 262 
abnormalities.41 263 
 264 
Radiation exposure after acute phase 265 
In Fukushima, municipalities have monitored the radiation dose from external 266 
exposure using a simple measurement device, such as a glass badge. Based on the 267 
results of a glass badge test conducted from September to November 2011 in 268 
Fukushima,33,42 the first year dose was calculated to be around 2.1 mSv in the northern 269 
part of Fukushima Prefecture. 270 
 271 
In the WHO’s preliminary dose estimation, a lifetime cumulative dose of twice the first 272 
year dose was assumed based on a reference first year dose for all organs/tissues.30,38 273 
The doses estimated for subsequent years in Fukushima City were generally consistent 274 
with this assumption. For example, in the case of Fukushima City, the mean annual 275 
dose estimated from the glass badge measurement decreased from 0.56 mSv in 2012 to 276 
0.44 and 0.32 mSv in 2013 and 2014, respectively.42 Thus, the lifetime dose beyond the 277 
first year in Fukushima City may be around 2 mSv, consistent with the assumptions of 278 
the WHO’s preliminary dose estimation.  279 
 280 
Radioactive cesium intake by ingesting food is the primary concern among residents 281 
living in radiation-affected areas.43 Whole-body counter assessments of internal 282 
radiation levels in residents of Minamisoma City, close to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, 283 
found levels of internal exposure that were too high to be due only to initial exposure,44 284 
and a subsequent study of risk factors for internal contamination found an association 285 
with food type and attention to food preparation.45 Radioactive cesium has been 286 
detected in mushrooms, wild vegetables, such meat as boar and birds in fields where the 287 
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ambient dose was relatively high.46 Radioactive cesium has also been detected in some 288 
types of preserved food, such as dried persimmons. It has been detected in marine 289 
products from river mouths in areas with relatively high ambient doses and in fish from 290 
coastal waters near the Fukushima Daiichi NPP.46 Residents in areas closest to the 291 
nuclear power plant can be exposed to very high levels of internal contamination even 292 
after a year since the accident through the consumption of these foods,47 and 293 
interventions to educate these residents and change food consumption practices can 294 
lead to rapid declines in internal contamination, indicating the importance of food–and 295 
especially wild foods– as a contamination pathway. Also, a simple radioactivity 296 
inspection is conducted prior to cooking food for school lunches in many regions.48,49 In 297 
Fukushima, the radioactive cesium detection level of fast track screening is usually 5-10 298 
Bq/kg, and actual levels in tested foods were far lower.50-52 An assessment by the 299 
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare in spring 2012 reported low additional internal 300 
exposure due to radioactive cesium intake at 0.0022 mSv / year in Fukushima.53 301 
 302 
Non-radiation-related events in Fukushima 303 
The major impacts of a severe nuclear accident are not limited to the health effects of 304 
radiation. Significant non-radiation related health disorders and psychological 305 
disturbances were observed among the affected population following the Chernobyl 306 
accident.5 The Fukushima accident underscored the importance of non-radiation-related 307 
issues, such as evacuation and long-term displacement of vulnerable people, and mental, 308 
psychological, and social factors.  309 
 310 
Evacuation of hospitals and nursing-care facilities 311 
Approximately 2,200 inpatients and elderly people at nursing-care facilities were 312 
rapidly evacuated before March 14, 2011. During or soon after evacuation, however, 313 
more than 50 inpatients and elderly people at nursing-facilities died19 from causes such 314 
as hypothermia, deterioration of underlying medical problems, and dehydration. The 315 
lack of medical support before, during, and after the evacuation was a major reason for 316 
the loss of life during the evacuation, and emphasizes the danger of unprepared 317 
evacuation for vulnerable populations.54 318 
 319 
Effect of relocation, displacement, and changes in living environment  320 
By May 2011, approximately 170,000 residents had been evacuated (voluntarily for 321 
about 20,000).19 The evacuation and relocation had various negative effects, particularly 322 
on the elder requiring nursing care and hospitalized patients.55-57 After the accident, the 323 
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mortality rate among evacuated elderly people requiring nursing care increased about 324 
3-fold in the first 3 months after evacuation and remained about 1.5-fold higher 325 
afterward compared with before the accident.54,58,59 Women accounted for 70% of the 326 
deaths: many of them were over 75 years old, and the main cause was pneumonia. 327 
Repeated relocation and the frequent changes in living environment posed significant 328 
adverse effects on the elderly people’s health.59 Their deaths were caused indirectly by 329 
the earthquake and tsunamis and were therefore certified by the local government as 330 
disaster-related deaths (DRDs).60 The DRDs in Fukushima accounted for 56% (1793 of 331 
3,194 in total) of all DRDs in the entire Tohoku region.61 Changes in the living 332 
environment also influenced those not evacuated. Families and communities became 333 
separated owing to differences in perceptions of radiation risk62; friction occurred 334 
between evacuees and residents of the evacuation destinations; mental and physical 335 
changes in the residents through the impact on their lifestyle and overall spirits were 336 
observed.63-67 337 
 338 
Mental health problems and poor health perceptions after NPP accidents 339 
Understandably Fukushima residents feared the invisible radiation exposure, even 340 
though external and internal doses were very low compared with the Chernobyl 341 
accident.65,68 After the Chernobyl accident, similar problems were reported, and the 342 
media disseminated misleading information on increased thyroid cancer among 343 
citizens.69 The psychological impact on adults was most strongly associated with their 344 
risk perception.70 The Chernobyl Forum held in 2006 reported that the studies of adults 345 
from the areas contaminated with radioactivity found a two-fold increase in 346 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other mood and anxiety disorders and 347 
significantly poorer subjective ratings of health.70 Based on these findings, the Forum 348 
concluded that adverse effects on mental health were the most serious public health 349 
issue after the accident. Likewise, the significant impact of the Fukushima accident on 350 
mental health was found in a survey about mental health and lifestyle conducted among 351 
residents of evacuation zones.71 The survey identified the great difficulties of evacuee 352 
families, who were separated and obliged to move to unfamiliar areas after the 353 
accident—similar to those observed among Chernobyl evacuees.68,72,73 The Fukushima 354 
mental health survey employed the Kessler six-item psychological distress scale (K6) to 355 
assess psychological distress (scores >20 denote significant, and 13-19 mild to moderate 356 
problems). The proportion of adult respondents with K6 ≥13 was 14.6% in 2011 and 357 
11.9% in 2012,71 much higher than the usual state of approximately 3%.74 Although only 358 
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a minority of people responded to the questionnaire, these results suggest that problems 359 
in mental health persist among adult Fukushima evacuees.  360 
 361 
Chernobyl evacuees who were children at the time of the accident perceived its 362 
consequences more seriously than their unaffected colleagues; however, their 363 
perceptions were not linked to such mental conditions as depression,75 suggesting 364 
resilience among Chernobyl’s young generation.76 The mental health and lifestyle 365 
survey through the Fukushima Health Management Survey investigated the mental 366 
health of child evacuees using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ). The 367 
proportion of SDQ ≥16 in 4- to 6-year-old children and elementary school children (aged 368 
6–12 years) was 24.4% and 22.0%, respectively, in 2011. That was twice the normal,77 369 
indicating the presence of severe psychological difficulties among child evacuees. 370 
However, the proportion of SDQ ≥16 diminished to 16.6% and 15.8%, respectively, in 4- 371 
to 6-year-old children and elementary school children in 2012,71 indicating that 372 
resilience among the child evacuees to that observed after the Chernobyl accident. 373 
 374 
The Fukushima mental health survey also investigated traumatic factors in the 375 
evacuees by employing a PTSD checklist (PCL).71 The proportions of PCL ≥44 among 376 
adults were 21.6% in 2011 and 18.3% in 2012, similar to that for rescue and cleanup 377 
workers (PCL ≥50, 20.1%), and greater than that for residents (PCL ≥44, 16%) in lower 378 
Manhattan after the World Trade Center September 11 attacks.78,79 These results 379 
indicated the magnitude of traumatic factors in the psychiatric influences among adult 380 
evacuees in the Fukushima accident. 381 
 382 
Psychological consequences for disaster workers  383 
Workers involved in the clean-up process after Chernobyl (often termed liquidators or 384 
cleanup workers) suffered various mental and physical morbidities.70,80 Following the 385 
Fukushima accident, TEPCO workers came under public criticism. Those workers were 386 
stigmatized and discriminated against.81 In a study conducted 2–3 months after the 387 
disaster, TEPCO workers who had suffered discrimination or slurs were two to three 388 
times more likely to have adverse psychological consequences than those without such 389 
exposure.82 A follow-up study showed both immediate and long-lasting psychological 390 
effects of discrimination.83 These investigations indicate that when workers are rejected 391 
from the society they are trying to save, such experiences may lead to ongoing health 392 




Discordance in families and communities 395 
In addition to the psychiatric problems described above, complex psycho-social issues 396 
arose in Fukushima including discordance in families and in society. Displacement, fear 397 
of radioactive exposure, compensation, employment, and other personal reasons 398 
produced rifts among residents and in communities. Three types of discordance may 399 
adversely affect families or communities in this way.84 First, different perceptions of the 400 
radiation risk result in discordance among family members. Parents with young 401 
children are especially susceptible to conflicts: mothers may prefer to move to other 402 
regions for their children’s sake, whereas fathers may be reluctant to do so.85 Second, 403 
interfamilial conflicts in the community result from disparities in governmental 404 
restrictions and compensations. Third, frustrations arise between evacuees and 405 
residents of communities accepting large numbers of evacuees (e.g., Iwaki). With time, 406 
the relationship between evacuees and recipient community members gradually 407 
deteriorates because of the undefined period of the evacuees’ stay, population increase, 408 
and rise in land prices. Discordance may become a difficult issue among Fukushima 409 
evacuees and reduce the resilience that the communities once had. 410 
 411 
Stigma and self-stigma   412 
Stigma is another issue among the evacuees and may arise through ignorance about 413 
radiation. For example, young women in Fukushima are afraid that some people may 414 
view them negatively owing to assumptions regarding the effects of radiation on future 415 
pregnancy or genetic inheritance.86 Through such misconceptions, evacuees often try to 416 
conceal the fact that they formerly lived in Fukushima.85 A similar phenomenon was 417 
reported among atomic bomb survivors,87 who often hesitate to talk about their life 418 
history and their experiences of the bombing. This is a type of self-stigma, which is 419 
induced and reinforced by public stigma. One study has demonstrated that self-stigma 420 
causes three different emotional reactions among stigmatized people: righteous anger; 421 
loss of self-esteem; and indifference.82,88 In Fukushima, self-stigma appears to have 422 
caused various emotional reactions leading to distress.85 Since the psychological effects 423 
of self-stigma cannot be ignored, it is necessary to develop countermeasures for public 424 
stigma to prevent affected people from further stigmatizing themselves. 425 
 426 
Lifestyle-related problems 427 
The Fukushima accident forced many evacuees to change various lifestyle aspects, such 428 
as diet, physical exercise, and other personal habits. The proportions of evacuees 429 
following government direction having less regular physical exercise (less than 430 
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once/week), drinking excessively (over 44-g ethanol/day), suffering mental problems, 431 
and experiencing sleeping difficulties were 51%, 10%, 20%, and 70%,71,89 respectively. 432 
Those proportions were higher than in other areas of Japan.74 These changes in 433 
health-related behaviours have raised concerns over the future risk of cardiovascular 434 
diseases among evacuees. According to a longitudinal analysis of the Fukushima Health 435 
Management Survey,90 an increased proportion of overweight individuals (body-mass 436 
index > 25 kg/m2) was significantly higher in evacuees than non-evacuees (31.5% to 437 
38.8% after the accident in evacuees, whereas 28.2% to 30.5% in non-evacuees).90,91 438 
After the accident, increased prevalence was observed in hypertension (53.9% to 60.1%), 439 
diabetes mellitus (10.2% to 12.2%), and dyslipidemia (44.3% to 53.4%) among the 440 
evacuees, but not the non-evacuees.90,91 Based on these results, the local government 441 
has promoted health awareness among evacuated residents.92 442 
 443 
Lessons learned from the Fukushima and past severe nuclear accidents 444 
After a nuclear accident, uncertainty over the extent and gravity of the accident results 445 
in confusing and contradictory information being issued by various sources, including 446 
administrative authorities, operators of the plant, the media, and scientists.13,14,19,24,93 447 
Restriction of information on the accident may further accelerate public anxiety, leading 448 
to proliferation of inaccurate information and public distrust.94,95 In such a disordered 449 
situation, health care professionals are often asked to explain the risks to the 450 
community.96 Information about the accident, including what is clear and what is not, 451 
needs to be disclosed by authorities and operators in a timely and organised fashion. 452 
Scientific messages based on accumulated evidence from atomic bombings and past 453 
nuclear accidents and provided by health care professionals should be used to enhance 454 
the public’s understanding of the impacts of the accident on the public’s health. 455 
 456 
The consequences of nuclear accidents vary substantially, ranging from short- to 457 
long-term health effects and from direct health to social and psychological effects. In the 458 
acute phase of an accident, the serious health effects due to uncontrolled exposure and 459 
multi-casualty accidents that require abundant medical resources are major 460 
concerns.4,22 Inadequate protection of the public from radiation exposure may lead to an 461 
increased incidence of cancer later in life.4 Meanwhile, we should be aware of potential 462 
adverse health risks accompanying the protective measures themselves; i.e., increased 463 
health risks associated with an unplanned evacuation or the relocation of vulnerable 464 
populations such as hospitalised patients and the elderly in nursing care 465 
facilities,54,58,59,64 and poor medical responses to life-threatening trauma or illnesses 466 
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within an evacuation zone around the nuclear facility.22,27 Following the acute phase, 467 
displacing hundreds of thousands of people creates a wide range of public healthcare 468 
and social issues that strike at the weakest link of the healthcare and societal 469 
system.89-92 Among these, major psychological consequences are most commonly 470 
observed after a nuclear accident.69-73 471 
 472 
The evacuation for a large population and vulnerable people needs to be carefully 473 
planned.64 Surrogate emergency systems that support local medical responses should be 474 
deployed promptly after an accident. Mental and psychological care as well as 475 
behavioural and social support for displaced people need to be put in place with 476 
coordinated approaches by the government, municipalities, academic organizations and 477 
volunteer groups. Finally, general public health services are prerequisite to counteract 478 
long-term adverse health effects after a severe nuclear accident.96 For all of these 479 
countermeasures, health care professionals should balance the protection from 480 
radiation with other health risks, and make efforts to mitigate the psychological effects 481 
that are most strongly associated with the risk perceptions of radiation.70 These 482 
challenging tasks constitute the agenda of future research. 483 
(4349 word) 484 
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Panel 1: Tokai-Mura criticality accident and development of radiation emergency 506 
medical hospitals in Japan 507 
 508 
In September 1999, a criticality accident at the JCO uranium-conversion plant in 509 
Tokai-Mura, Japan occurred when workers inappropriately poured enriched uranyl 510 
nitrate solution into a precipitation vessel, triggering fission reactions (Tokai-Mura 511 
criticality accident).23 The local government advised residents to evacuate from the area 512 
within a 350 m radius of the plant. It took 19 hours to terminate the criticality. Three 513 
workers were exposed to a massive dose of neutron and gamma ray radiation and 514 
developed ARS, resulting in two deaths from an estimated exposure exceeding 6 Gy 515 
equivalent. Besides these 3 workers, 169 JCO employees, 260 emergency personnel and 516 
234 residents were exposed to radiation with maximum estimated doses of 48, 9.4 and 517 
21mSv, respectively. Although there were human casualties, no major release of 518 
radioactive materials was observed and therefore this accident was graded as INES 519 
level 4, i.e., an accident with local consequences. The Tokai-Mura criticality accident 520 
highlighted the importance of integrated critical care for patients exposed to high dose 521 
radiation. In addition, risk communication was indicated as one of the key issues in 522 
public relation after a nuclear accident.24 523 
Base on lessons learned from this accident, the radiation emergency hospital system 524 
had been enhanced particularly focusing on work-related accidents with high dose 525 
radiation exposure22, however, not for such large-scale natural disasters as 526 
Fukushima.19 Accordingly, 2 referral hospitals were designated as the tertiary radiation 527 
emergency hospitals where advanced treatment for ARS or severe internal 528 
contamination was provided. Seventy-four hospitals in prefectures where NPPs were 529 
located were also designated as primary or secondary radiation emergency facilities 530 
where patients were triaged and treated, then transferred to tertiary hospitals when 531 
indicated. Of note, 38 of these hospitals were located within a 30 km radius of NPPs, 532 
meaning these hospitals may lose their function if a severe nuclear accident mandates 533 
evacuation from the area. 534 
  535 
19 
 
Panel 2: Protection of emergency workers from radiation exposure 536 
 537 
Most national regulations for radiation protection are based on the 1990 538 
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).1 539 
International standards, such as the International Basic Safety Standards, various 540 
international labor conventions, and European directives on radiological protection, are 541 
also based on those recommendations. The ICRP revised its recommendations and 542 
updated them as ICRP Publication 103 in 2007.25 According to the new publication, the 543 
dose limit for occupational exposure is 100 mSv over 5 years and 100 mSv for emergency 544 
work. Occupational exposure of workers occurs during the performance of duties 545 
involving radiation, such as those conducted after an accident by workers regularly 546 
employed at the plant and by other workers engaged in recovery and rescue operations. 547 
Many workers need to be involved in on-site mitigation and other activities. Such 548 
workers are subject to internationally established limits for occupationally exposed 549 
workers. However, a small number of skillful workers are expected to be involved in 550 
emergency tasks. Thus, the dose limits are 500–1000 mSv as reference levels to avoid 551 
the occurrence of deterministic effects for workers in an emergency situation.  552 
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Panel 3: Injuries of emergency and recovery workers in response to the accident 553 
 554 
By the end of September 2014, 754 workers had sought medical treatment at the site. 555 
Five deaths were observed: three workers developed cardiac arrest owing to acute 556 
myocardial infarction; there was one case of aortic dissection, and another person 557 
suffered from asphyxia caused by a landslide during the construction of a pile 558 
foundation. Among the workers, there were only 12 cases of contamination with 559 
radioactive substances—all of which occurred in March 2011. There was an increase in 560 
heat illness in May to July. In all, 88 workers suffered from heat illness; however, no 561 
severe cases, such as heat stroke, were reported. To coordinate efforts for emergency 562 
medical care and provide an adequate working environment for NPP personnel, the 563 
Emergency Medical System Network was established: its purpose is to examine 564 
occupational environments, institute preventive medicine, particularly in summer to 565 
avert heat stroke, and conduct follow-up of workers with chronic illnesses and mental 566 
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Table and Figure legends 847 
 848 
Table: Summary of past major nuclear accidents 849 
* Prefixes of the SI unit; T (tera): 1012, Bq: becquere 850 
**The INES at nuclear facilities is classified on the scale of seven levels based on the 851 
radiation doses to people and widespread release of radioactive materials, violation of 852 
radiological barriers and control within an installation, and dysfunction of accident 853 
preventing measures.2 854 
INES Level 7: major release of radioactive material with widespread health and 855 
environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended 856 
countermeasures 857 
INES Level 6: significant release of radioactive material to require implementation of 858 
planned countermeasures 859 
INES level 5: limited release of radioactive material to require implementation of some 860 
planned countermeasures, severe damage to reactor core 861 
 862 
Figure 1: Location of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant17 863 
 864 
Figure 2: Irradiation dose and number of workers involved with the emergency and 865 
recovery operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (March 11, 2011 to 866 
August 31, 2013)24 867 
*Max: 678.08mSv (external exposure, 88.08mSv; internal exposure, 590mSv） 868 













Location Southern Urals, Russia Sellafield, UK Pennsylvania, USA Chernobyl, Russia Fukushima, Japan
Year 1957 Sep 1957 Oct 1979 Mar 1986 Apr 2011 Mar
Type of accident Chemical explosion of the
containment tank of liquid
radioactive wastes at the military
installation
Fire of the nuclear reactor at the
military installation designed to
produce plutonium
Partial core melt at the civilian
nuclear reactor
Core explosion and fire at the
civilian nuclear reactor
Core melt-through
3 reactor cores damaged
















Area contaminated with Sr-90
> 74 kBq/m2 (2 Ci/km2) : 1000 km2
> 3.7 kBq/m2 (0.1 Ci/km2): 15000
km2
Milk distribution was banned in an
area stretching from 10 km north of
Windscale Works to 20 km to the
south.
Area contaminated with Cs-137
> 560 kBq/m2: 10,000 km2
> 190 kBq/m2: 21,000 km2
Area contaminated with Cs-137
> 560 kBq/m2: 600 km2
> 190 kBq/m2: 2,000 km2




270,000 lived in the area
contaminated
195,000 residents living within 20
miles evacuated voluntarily
115,000 residents evacuated in 1986
(subsequently 220,000 evacuated)
270,000 population lived in "strict
control zone" (contaminated area)
213,000 residents evacuated (20,000
evacuated voluntarily)
Dose estimates Average effective dose of residents:
170mSv preceding evacuation,
520mSv in effective dose equivalent
Maximum estimated thyroid doses
of residents
Adults: the order of 10 mGy
Children: conceivably 100 mGy
Maximum effective dose: 40 mSv
(emergency worker)




Workers with acute radiation
sickness
 <2.1 Gy: 41 persons, 2.2 - 4.1 Gy: 50
persons, 4.2 - 6.4 Gy: 22 persons, 6.5
- 16  Gy: 21 persons
Average thyroid dose of residents
Evacuees:
 Adults: 349 mGy
 Pre-school children: 1548 mGy
Residents in contaminated area:
 Adults: 138mGy
 Pre-school children: 449 mGy
Maximum effective dose: 678 mSv
(emergency worker)
Maximum thyroid dose: 12 Gy
(emergency worker)
Maximum effective dose of
residents: 25 mSv (external)
Maximum average thyroid dose of
infants in the most affected district:
80 mGy
Implications Restriction of information on the
accident by the government
Poor preparedness before the
accident
Scarcity of information about plant
condition and evacuation plan
No effective plan for hospital and
nursing care facility evacuation
Restriction of information on the
accident by the government
Delay in implementation of public
protection
Long-term psychological issues
Severe health consequences in
evacuation and relocation of
hospitalized patients and elderly
people requiring nursing care
Psycho-social issues after the
accident
Risk communication
Figure
Figure 1 
